Remuneration Policy Report

The Remuneration Committee presents the proposed Executive Directors' Remuneration Policy Report for 2018. This policy will take effect immediately, following approval at the 2018 annual general meeting and will apply until a further policy is approved by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders. The Committee believes that this Policy continues in being competitive for current and successor Executive Directors.

The Committee has determined that to maintain top performance levels in the Company they should be targeting at least median level remuneration packages for the Chief Executive Officer, other Executive Directors and Senior Management. However, the Committee recognizes that this will be achieved by adjusting remuneration packages over a number of years. The Committee has agreed that a competitive benchmarking study will be commissioned every three years in order to maintain independent guidance on the overall remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer, other Executive Directors and Senior Management.

Under the Remuneration Policy, the Committee has discretion in a number of areas as set out in the relevant section of the policy. In addition, certain operational and administrative discretions may be exercised under relevant standalone deeds of grant or plan rules, including LTiP and EIP implemented for the I.P.O., the rules of which we have previously filed with the SEC.

Proposed policy changes

The 2018 policy that is being presented to shareholders for approval has been drafted to take into account the latest findings from a recent competitive benchmarking study over the existing policy. The key changes from the 2017 policy, which are described in the chairman's letter, can be summarized as follows:

- The maximum annual cash bonus opportunity for the Chief Executive Officer is increased from 150% to 200% of base salary. Included within this, the Additional Percentage Bonus (APB) set at a maximum of 50% of base salary under the existing remuneration policy, attributable to the achievement of specific additional non-financial targets, will now be set at the start of each year at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee.
- The maximum annual cash bonus opportunity for other Executive Directors remains unchanged at 120% of base salary. Included within this, the APB set at a maximum of 40% of base salary under the existing remuneration policy, attributable to the achievement of specific additional nonfinancial targets, will now be set at the start of each year at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee.
- The maximum value of share incentive awards under the Company's Long-term incentive plan ('LTiP') available for the achievement of certain financial targets for the Chief Executive Officer is increased from 150% to 220% of base salary and for the other Executive Directors increased from 120% to 150% of base salary.
- The Non-Executive Directors, at their discretion, may choose to forgo annual or periodic increases to cash fee, in lieu of an equivalent value of share awards. Awards will continue to be made annually immediately after the annual general meeting, however, as a result, the maximum value of these awards will be increased from 50% up to 55% of the Non-Executive Directors existing annual fee. Pending shareholder approval, for 2018, all Non-Executive Directors have elected to receive additional share awards in the Company and forgo the annual increase to their base fee.

The above proposed changes to policy will be effective immediately following the 2018 annual general meeting. The impact of these changes to the remuneration of the Executive Directors is demonstrated in the illustrative remuneration chart on page 60.

The tables below sets out the main components of the remuneration packages for the Chief Executive Officer and other Executive Directors.

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHER EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS **Fixed Remuneration** Purpose and Link to Strategy: To attract, retain and incentivize high caliber individuals who can deliver the company's strategy and reward Base salary performance. To be competitive. Operation: Maximum Opportunity: Reviewed annually and normally fixed for 12 months from 1 January in each year. No prescribed maximum to avoid setting expectations. Paid in 12 equal monthly installments. The Committee retain discretion to re-adjust salaries as part of the Reviews take account of a variety of different factors including: overall package to, at or about median of the external comparator group deemed appropriate by them to maximize the Group's objective - The rise in the cost of living, market rates, responsibility of the position, of top quartile performance. Where it is satisfied that salaries are at or experience and contribution of the individual, the scale of the Group's operations, about the median of the external comparator group, annual increases group performance and affordability, remuneration levels and increases in the rest will normally be limited to the increases granted to the wider of the Group; - The Executive pay packages of comparable companies; Pay and practices in workforce, but may be higher in certain circumstances such as a both the US and the UK. change in the role or an increase in the responsibilities of the role where it will increase salaries in its discretion. Purpose and Link to Strategy: Benefits in kind To aid recruitment and retention of high caliber individuals and to remain competitive in the market. Operation: Maximum Opportunity: Benefits received by directors will generally include car allowance or mileage No maximum value is set but the Committee periodically monitors the reimbursement, medical and dental insurance. Additional benefits may be provided overall cost of the benefits to ensure they are affordable, competitive where required by legislation or to align the remuneration package with market and in line with market practice in the UK and the US. practice where these are not significant in value. The company may introduce new benefits that are or become prevalent in the jurisdiction in which it operates or in which the director is based. Where an individual director is relocated benefits such as relocation expenses, travel expenses, accommodation, tax equalization; professional advice, and post-retirement medical expenses may be provided. Performance Metric: Provisions for Recovery or Withholding of Payment: None None Purpose and Link to Strategy: **Pension or 401K Contributions** To provide funding for retirement and aid recruitment and retention of high caliber individuals Operation: **Maximum Opportunity:** Under the Defined contribution arrangements the Company makes an Following the closure of the defined benefits scheme to future accrual in April 2016, all Directors will have benefits provided by the registered defined contribution annual contribution into a personal pension plan, 401K plan or salary supplement in lieu of pension or 401K contributions up to a maximum of 25% of basic salary. For those directors whose pension planning is restricted by one or more tax allowance, an equivalent allocation or payment may be made to an unregistered alternative savings vehicle, or as a salary supplement in lieu of pension contributions. Arrangements are reviewed annually to ensure consistency with market practice and take account of the effect of regulatory change on an individual's benefits. For directors based in other jurisdictions they will be offered arrangements appropriate to that jurisdiction. Performance Metric: Provisions for Recovery or Withholding of Payment: None

None

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHER EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS Variable Remuneration

Purpose and Link to Strategy:

Annual bonus

To retain, motivate, incentivize high caliber individuals and promote the achievement of key financial and strategic goals and targets of the Company in the financial year to which it relates.

Operation:

Cash bonus for performance over the previous financial year.

Targets are set at the beginning of the financial year and normally based on achievement of a mix of financial targets (typically profit before tax and net cash flow) measured against the approved annual budget for the bonus year and usually awarded for achieving on a sliding scale between Threshold, Target, and Stretch. The Committee has retained the flexibility to determine one or more elements may be earned for attaining target and stretch or a single target.

The Remuneration Committee has flexibility to use non-financial and personal targets if deemed appropriate in addition to financial targets.

In addition the Committee has reserved discretion to offer an Additional Percentage Bonus (APB) on achievement of specific additional targets set by them at their discretion aligned with the strategic goals of the Company for that year.

The bonus for achieving threshold is at the discretion of the Committee but will normally be one quarter of the potential.

Maximum Opportunity:

Maximum bonus is capped (including APB) at:

- 200% of salary for the Chief Executive;
- 120% of salary for Other Executive Directors.

The APB discretionary award offered will be set at the start of each year at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee.

Performance Metric:

Weighting of measures and between measures for achieving financial and non-financial targets are adjusted annually and are discretionary being driven by the Company's strategy, financial goals and requirement to maintain and improve operating efficiencies.

The APB performance metric is discretionary based on the associated strategic objective for which the APB is offered.

Provisions for Recovery or Withholding of Payment:

None. If the Director qualifies as a "good leaver" during the year to which the bonus relates, it is payable retrospectively pro-rata to the time in service during the calendar year.

Long-term incentive plan ('LTiP')

Purpose and Link to Strategy:

Attract and retain high quality senior employees in an environment where compensation levels are based on a global market.

Align rewards for employees with returns to shareholders through personal financial investment. Reward achievement of business targets and key strategic objectives.

Operation:

The type and level of award made and the criteria for vesting are considered annually to ensure they continue to support shareholder alignment and group strategy.

The LTiP provides the Remuneration Committee the discretion to grant time-based, market value or performance-based awards in the form of Options, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) Restricted Stock, Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) and Other stock based awards or a combination of such awards. The discretion over what type or combination of types of award to be made will be exercised by the Remuneration Committee based on what they consider to be the market norms in the UK and US and the particular circumstance in which the award is made.

Awards are made and are satisfied through the use of existing treasury shares or through the issue of new shares. Participants are required to pay at a minimum the nominal cost of the regular share.

The Committee has the discretion (which will be used as deemed appropriate to a good leaver in a particular circumstance, such as retirement of long serving employees or leaving due to sickness or disability) to:

- Accelerate vesting and exercise dates;
- Waive conditions to vesting or exercise or transferability;
- Extend exercise periods after termination of employment.

RSU's can be settled in cash or shares or a combination of both at the discretion of the Committee. This discretion will be exercised based on what is in the best interests of the Company.

Awards may accrue dividends either under the rules of the Plan or at the discretion of the Committee, payable in cash or shares. Options and RSUs that vest accrue a dividend until vesting payable in cash or shares as determined at the discretion of the Committee.

Maximum Opportunity:

The LTIP maximum awards in any calendar year may not exceed:

- Chief Executive 220% of base salary;
- Other Executive Directors 150% of base salary.

The maximum amount of dividend paid will be the dividends paid on the regular share over which the awards are granted between grant and vesting.

Performance Metric:

Under the LTiP the Committee has the discretion to use a range of performance targets. Performance targets for performance awards will be those deemed appropriate by the Committee to support the long term strategy of the group set at the time of grant and in the best interests of the Company. For recent performance awards the Committee has used profit, cash flow, EPS and TSR in various combinations of each.

Provisions for Recovery or Withholding of

If, during the preparation of the current year's accounts, a material misstatement of the previous year's accounts is discovered, a clawback of the awards granted in respect of the misstated element of the previous year's accounts shall apply. Leavers are treated as set out in the section of this report titled Policy on *Payment for Loss of Office*.

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employment as a good leaver through redundancy,

retirement, disability, or TUPE transfer.

Purpose and Link to Strategy: All employee share incentive plans To encourage share ownership by all employees in the group and increase alignment with shareholders. Operation: **Maximum Opportunity:** The UK all employee share incentive plan is an HMRC approved plan, subject to prescribed Participants in the UK plan, including the executive limits, to provide all eligible employees (including executive directors) with a tax-efficient way of directors, can invest up to £150 per month (£1,800 p.a.) or purchasing regular shares out of monthly savings over a 6 monthly accumulation period. The 10% of salary, if lower, in any tax year to purchase regular Company currently provides 1 matching share free for every 2 share purchased. stock shares. Regular shares are purchased using the participants' contributions at the end of each accumulation A tax-efficient share purchase program is offered to our US colleagues, and additional share period at the lower of the price at the start of the incentive schemes may be offered where practical on a cost-efficient basis. accumulation period and the price immediately before purchase. The maximum number of shares matched is 1:1, but the matching is currently 1:2. Dividends on both purchased shares and matching shares are used to purchase additional shares. The plan or plans implemented for other jurisdictions in which the Group operates may have maximum opportunity commensurate with the UK plan or their legislation if deemed appropriate by the Committee. Performance Metric: Provisions for Recovery or Withholding of Payment: None Under the UK plan, matching shares are forfeited if not held for 3 years except if the participant leaves

Non-Executive Directors

Fees	Purpose and Link to Strategy: Reflects the time commitment required for the ro To attract and retain executive directors with the To be in line with UK and US market practice.	ole. e skill set and experience required by the Company.
Operation:		Maximum Opportunity:
Fees may be paid in cash, shares or a combination of both cash and shares. Neither the Board Chairman nor the Non-Executive Directors are paid supplemental fees for any of their committee responsibilities, however, the discretion is reserved to do so if it is deemed appropriate and in line with market practice. The cash element of the fees is reviewed annually. Reviews take account of a variety of different factors including: Inflation, market rates, affordability, remuneration levels and increases in the rest of the Group; Pay and practices in both the US and the UK.		There is no prescribed maximum for the cash element for the fees to avoid setting expectations. Fees are and will be increased in line with the market. Non-Executive Directors serving for at least six months from appointment receive share based fee awards valued at up to 55% of annual fees at date of award.
Non-Executive Directors may choose to forgo ar lieu of an equivalent value of share awards at the Fees for the Non-Executive Directors and Chain		
The share based element of the fees is a non-di options, restricted stock or restricted stock units.		
Awards are made annually immediately after the day before the following years AGM.		

Differences between Policy for Directors and Employees

There are differences in the remuneration policy for Executive Directors and the approach to remuneration of other employees which reflect differing levels of responsibility and seniority within the organization and market norms in the jurisdictions in which the employees are employed. The following are differences in the remuneration policy for Executive Directors and the approach to remuneration for other employees generally:

- The bonus arrangements for the executives, directors and senior, middle and lower management
 are structured broadly on the same basis to ensure commonality of objectives but at a lower
 percentage level depending on the seniority of the manager in the group. There is a greater
 emphasis on performance-related pay for management levels, and lower levels of bonus
 opportunity or no bonus opportunity may apply to other employees in the group, depending on
 local policies;
- Benefits are generally offered that meet market norms in the jurisdiction in which employees are employed and take into account the position in which they are employed;
- Pension arrangements are offered where it is the market norm to offer such arrangements in the
 jurisdiction in which the employee is employed. Where such arrangements are in place
 membership is encouraged. Where local regulation permits, higher contributions may be put in
 place for more senior management if that is the market norm. The main pension plans that the
 group operates are described in Note 29 of the financial statements;
- Participation in the LTiP is limited to Executive Directors and a selected number of senior officers and senior managers. At the discretion of the Committee, market value share awards or timebased share awards may be awarded to employees in recognition of outstanding performance or achievement and to encourage share ownership and retention. U.K. employees, if eligible, can participate in the U.K. SIP.

Approach to Recruitment Remuneration

Executive Directors

When setting a remuneration package for new Executive Directors, including internal promotions, the Committee will apply similar principles to those set out in the most recent approved remuneration policy for both short term and long term incentives depending on the experience of the new executive. The table below sets out the maximum variable pay opportunities.

Maximum Variable Pay Opportunities

Element of Remuneration	Approach	Maximum Opportunity	
Base salary	Set in line with policy at a level appropriate to the role and experience of the new executive. This may include, if appropriate, an agreement to increase base salary over a defined period up to a pre-defined level on acquiring experience and having delivered satisfactory performance in the role, in which case the salary increases may exceed inflation or increases given to the general work force in the country in which the executive is based.	In line with existing policy.	
Benefits	In line with existing policy.	In line with existing policy.	
Pension	In line with existing policy.		
Annual Bonus	In line with existing policy. May be pro-rated to reflect the proportion of the year served. In line with existing p		
Long-term Incentives	In line with existing policy.		

Upon Appointment

In relation to external appointments, the Committee may consider compensating candidates in cash or shares for remuneration relinquished on leaving their former employment if they consider it to be in the best interests of the Company and the shareholders. In considering such payments, the Committee would take into consideration the amount of remuneration forgone, the nature, vesting dates and performance requirements attached to the remuneration foregone.

In respect of internal promotions, any commitments made to the new executive before his/her promotion will continue to be honoured by the Committee even if not consistent with the approved policy outlined above in terms of short term and long-term incentives awarded but yet to be earned.

New Executive Directors will be required to hold shares to the value of 150% of their annual basic salary. The Chief Executive Officer will be allowed a period of three years from date of appointment to acquire this holding.

The Committee may award an incoming Executive Director up to 100% of basic salary in time-based options outside of the terms of reference of the LTiP. These options would vest in three equal tranches over the three anniversaries of award.

The Committee may award an incoming Executive Director up to three hundred percent of basic salary in performance-based options outside of the terms of reference of the LTiP. These options may be made available in tranches with different performance targets and over a period of up to seven years to allow for the delivery of strategic objectives. Shares acquired under this element must be retained for a minimum of five years from date of appointment.

Non-Executive Directors

New Non-Executive Directors will be paid fees on the same basis as the existing Non-Executive Directors. They will also participate in the Non-Executive Directors Incentive Plan under which the annual awards are non-discretionary. The form of the award can be in the form of Options, Restricted Stock, or Restricted Stock Units, given at the discretion of the Board and based on the value of each type of award and the number of shares left in the plan. The vesting period is in the discretion of what the relevant committee of the Board believes is in the best interests of the Company.

Service Contracts

Executive Directors

The Company has entered into a service contract with the single current Executive Director that is not for a fixed term. Executive Directors have service contracts that ordinarily are terminable by twelve months' notice by either the Company or the director, which notice can be given at any time. The Company may terminate an Executive Director's contract without notice on the occurrence of certain events identified in their contract which would normally consist of conduct justifying summary dismissal, including gross misconduct.

Executive Directors' Service Contracts

Director	Date of Current Contract	Notice Period	Remuneration Entitlement
Alok Maskara	23 May 2017		Payment in lieu of notice in the event of early termination. This may include base salary benefits and pension payable for the notice period. A bonus may be paid if the period for which pay in lieu of notice is made extends past the year end subject to targets being met.

Executive Directors have the same employment rights as any other employee in the case of redundancy or if the termination of their employment was determined by a relevant tribunal to be unfair under English law.

In the event of a change in control, and their contract is not assumed by the acquiring entity or a materially different position is offered to Executive Directors, on termination of their contract a severance payment based on the group standard severance policy will be payable, but calculated by doubling the highest annual base salary prior to the change of control instead of using the last twelve months' salary under their normal notice provisions.

The LTiP provisions provide that upon a change in control, all unvested time-based awards will fully vest and become exercisable as applicable and unless determined by the Committee, shall lapse on the first anniversary of the change of control if not exercised as applicable. Under the rules of the LTiP all performance-based awards will vest pro-rata based on the performance results to the date of change and the elapsed portion of the performance period.

Service agreements for new recruits to the Board and internal promotions will be on the same basis as the current Executive Director with no fixed term and will be terminable by either party on twelve months' notice. Executive Directors may make provision, at the discretion of the Company for pay in lieu of notice for early termination which will include base salary, benefit and pension contributions and may include payment of the annual bonus. They may also make provision for similar change of control provisions as offered to the current Executive Director if the Committee considers it is market practice or in the best interests of the Company.

Non-Executive Directors

The Company has entered into letters of appointment with the Non-Executive Directors and the Chairman that are not for a fixed term.

Non-Executive Directors' Letters of Appointment

	Date of Current Letter of Appointment	Notice Period and Entitlement to Fees
Joseph Bonn	28 February, 2007	3 months, except if the director fails to be re-elected at an AGM when the contract terminates immediately without notice or compensation.
David Landless	20 February, 2013	3 months, except if the director fails to be re-elected at an AGM when the contract terminates immediately without notice or compensation.
Brian Kushner	24 May, 2016	3 months, except if the director fails to be re-elected at an AGM when the contract terminates immediately without notice or compensation.
Adam Cohn	18 July, 2016	3 months, except if the director fails to be re-elected at an AGM when the contract terminates immediately without notice or compensation.
Clive Snowdon	29 July, 2016	3 months, except if the director fails to be re-elected at an AGM when the contract terminates immediately without notice or compensation.

The Chairman and the Non-Executive Directors do not have any employment rights. New appointees to the Board will generally be appointed on the same basis as the current Non-Executive Directors.

Directors' service agreements and letters of appointment are available for inspection at the registered office of the Company.

Policy on Payment for Loss of Office

Contractual entitlements to the date of termination will be honoured and the Company will pay any amounts it is required to pay in accordance with the Directors statutory employment or contractual rights and to settle those rights. The Company will seek to apply the principles of mitigation to ensure it is not paying more than is required. In the event of a compromise or severance agreement, the Committee may make payments it considers reasonable in settlement of potential legal claims. It may include in such payments reasonable incidental and professional fees paid by a director.

There is generally no entitlement to annual bonus on cessation of employment for leavers in the first half of the calendar year. Good leavers in the second half of the calendar year may, at the Committee's discretion, be retrospectively paid a time pro-rated bonus. Leavers departing after the year-end, but before completion of the audit, will be paid the actual bonus earned on the normal bonus payment date. Leavers are not eligible for bonus payments if they are in breach of any obligations of their contract of employment, including the period of notice

On termination of employment, outstanding share awards will be treated in accordance with the relevant plan rules:


LTiP: The default treatment under the LTiP is that subject to the Committee's discretion, after a participant ceases to be employed by the Company, for any reason other than termination for Cause, all unvested time-based awards will immediately lapse or be forfeited and all vested unexercised options and stock appreciation rights (SARs) will lapse on the first anniversary of the date of leaving. In the case of termination of the participant's employment for Cause, all time-based awards will immediately lapse or be forfeited as at the date of termination and all unexercised options will immediately lapse or be forfeited as at the date of termination. If employment of a participant is terminated for any reason, other than for Cause, performance-based awards will vest on a pro-rated basis based on the performance results to the date of termination. In case of termination of employment for Cause, all unvested performance-based awards will lapse as of the date of termination.

IPO Options: The default treatment under the I.P.O. standalone option grants for both Executive and Non-Executive Directors is that subject to the relevant Committees' discretion, after a participant's termination of employment for any reason other than for Cause, the vested unexercised portion of the options will lapse on the first anniversary of the date of termination unless exercised beforehand. If a participant's employment is terminated for Cause, all unexercised options will immediately lapse.

The definition of Cause for both the LTiP and the I.P.O. options is as defined in the participant's service contract or, if not so defined, would be conduct that would constitute grounds for summary dismissal.

The Committee has the discretion to accelerate vesting and exercise dates, waive conditions to vesting or exercise or extend exercise periods after termination of employment. The Committee may exercise their discretion to allow accelerated vesting or extended exercise periods, which discretion it will normally exercise in such circumstances as long serving directors retiring before the last vesting date or leaving employment through ill health or redundancy. This graph seeks to demonstrate how pay

varies with performance. The graph is reflective of the remuneration policy that is being presented for approval at the 2018 AGM.



Notes:

- 1. The base salary of the Executive Directors used is the 2018 confirmed salary in U.S. dollars for the year ending 31 December, 2018.
- 2. The Remuneration Committee sets bonus targets early in 2018. Annual cash bonus is earned only when Company performance exceeds a threshold level. 'On plan' bonus is generally set to be half the potential and is paid for achievement of the annual budget. Maximum bonus is earned for hitting a stretch target considerably above the Board-approved budget, and represents exceptional performance.
- 3. The LTiP is a combination of performance and time-based awards with targets being set by the Committee. Within each year, there is a threshold level, an 'on plan'; level, and a stretch level. Performance below the threshold would mean no performance element of the LTiP would be awarded in the following year. Hitting the plan targets would result in granting total awards at maximum value of 150% of base salary for the Chief Executive Officer and at 100% of base salary for the Other Executive Director. Each subsequent year's target represents a material improvement on the prior-year target. Reaching stretch targets would mean that the Company had considerably out-performed the Board's expectations, would result in a maximum granting at 220% of the value of base salary for the Chief Executive Officer and at 150% of the value of base salary for the Other Executive Director.
- 4. The above illustration excludes remuneration in the form of taxable benefits and pension contributions.

Consideration of Conditions Elsewhere in the Group

While the major influence in setting the Executive Directors' pay and benefits is benchmarking of comparable companies, consideration is given to pay and benefits throughout the Group, so that there is a clear structure of pay and benefits layer by layer. Benchmarking studies commissioned by the Committee normally include other senior executive positions. When undertaking annual reviews of basic salary, the general level of cost-of-living increases throughout the Group is taken into account.

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The Committee does not consult with employees when drawing up the Directors' Remuneration Policy. No internal comparison metrics were used, but the Committee is aware of average pay and benefits packages within the Group.

Shareholders' Views

The Committee take into consideration the views expressed by institutional shareholder bodies when formulating the terms of the awards to Executive Directors.